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A Game-theoretic Interpretation for the 
Free-rider Problem under the Lindahl 
Mechanism 
Mikio Nakayama* 
Abstract: An exposition of the free rider problem in a public good 
economy is presented by the use of a non-cooperative n-person game. It is 
shown that the personalized Lindahl prices are not the Nash equilibria of 
the game. 
1. It was proved by Foley (1970) that in an economy with public 
goods there exist Lindahl equilibria and that they are contained in the core 
of the economy. Unlike in a market of private goods only, different agents 
must face different prices for each public good under the Lindahl equilibria. 
However, as is well-known in literature 〔e.g., Buchanan (1968) ), each 
agent will have an incentive to 'free ride' on the benefit of the public good. 
As a result the Lindahl mechanism would not work, since no agent would 
behave as a price-taker for the Lindahl prices. The purpose of this note is 
to interpret the free rider problem under the Lindahl mechanism in terms 
of n-person game theory. This approach would be of some use in explaining 
the nature of the problem. 
*The author would like to thank Mr. M. Kaneko for helpful comments and 
suggestions. 
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2. We consider a very simple economy comprised of n consumers, one 
public good and freely transferable money. Let N = {1，…，n} be the set of 
al consumers. The public good is consumed collectively and equally by al 
individuals in N. The utility of individual i received from consuming q 
amount of the public good is given by u/q), which is measured in terms 
of money. The cost of producing q amount of the public good is given by 
C(q). We assume: 
(a) ui(q) is differentiable on (0, oo )with zん＞Oand u"iく0,
(b) C(q) is differentiable on (0, oo) with C'>O, C">O, C(O) =0 and 
lim C'(q) =0. 
q→＋O 
Lindahl equilibrium in this economy is a pair （ρ＊；q*) =(pt，…月；q勺
such that 
u/q*)-p"fq*=max (ui(qi）ー ρ"fqi),for al i EN (1) 
のとO
E Pfo*-C(q*) =max CE P"Tq-C(q)) (2) 
iεN q二三O tεN 
At the Lindahl equilibrium （ρ＊； q*), each individual i receives a net benefit: 
xi=ui(q*)-p"fq＊ 十di（~ Pjq*-C(q*)), 
J（三N
where d=(d1，・・，dn) represents a fixed proportion of profits satisfying 
L; di=l and di>O for al ic.N. 
1εN 
3. Now, suppose that each individual i EN decides もisprice' for the 
public good and announces it to the producer. The level of supply is, then, 
determined through profit maximization at the price of the sum announced 
voluntarily by al individuals. Let Pi= [O，ム〕 bea closed interval with品
being sufficiently large, from which individual i chooses his price わ（九三三0)
for the public good. Define a set Q for each PEP=P1 〉〈・・×pnby 
Q={qと0:2J Piq-C(q)=max CE Piz-C(z))} (3) 
i巴N z二三O t己入f
It is clear from assumption (b) that Q is nonempty and consists of a unique 
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point for each ρEP. 
Then, we can define a payoff function f(P) = Cf1 (P），…，f n (p)) as follows: 
f ／ρ） =ui(q(p） わーq（ρ）+di{ L; pjq（ρ）－C(q(p))}, (4) 
jEN 
where q(p) is the unique point in Q for PEP. Thus we have defined a 
game characterized by N, P and f. A Nash equilibrium point of the game is 
a point p0= （対，…， P~ ）EP such that 
f/p0) =max Ji （ρ！，…， P0i-I• Pi，列＋I，…， P~） for al iEN. (5) 
めξPi
明Tecall ρ＊EP a Lindahl price if the pair (P*;q(p*)) is a Lindahl equilib-
num. 
4. The behaviour of free riding under the Lindahl mechanism is 
expressed in this game as that of choosing a strategy Pi=O or less than his 
Lindahl price P1. The following proposition reveals the game theoretic 
nature of such behaviours. 
Proposition. Let P* E P be a Lindahl price. Then, P* is not a Nash equi-
librium point of the game if q*>O, where P*=q（ρ＊〉．
Proof. We note initially that the function q(p) is differentiable for al 
ρ＞O, since C'(q) = ~ Pi for qEQ and C’（ q) is monotone increasing, 
iE三N
differentiable with Cぺq）手0for al q>O. 
Suppose that P* is a Nash equilibrium point. Then we have 
fipi（ρ＊〉主主0, if 0く内三~Pi (6) 
where fipi(P*) denotes the value of the parial derivative of Ji（ρ） atρ＝ρ＊ 
with respect to Pi・ Since (P* ;q*) is a Lindahl equilibrium with q*>O, 
we have 
u/(q*) ＝舛＞O,0, for al i EN, 
C'(q*) ＝戸 pf.
iE三λr
Then, 
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fiPi(P*) =u/(q*)qpi（ρ＊）－P'fqpi（ρ＊）－q（ρ＊〉
十di(q （戸）＋~： ρrqpi （ρ＊）－C’ （q*)qpJρ＊〉〉
iEN 
＝ー （1--,di)q(p*) 
く0, for al i EN. 
From this and (6) we have PT= 0, which contradicts (7). Q. E. D. 
(8) 
This proposition states that if the public good is to be produced, then 
there is an individual who can make himself better off by choosing a price 
other than the Lindahl one, provided that any other individual stays at the 
Lindahl price. In fact, every individual has an incentive not to pay up to 
PT, as is seen in (8). It is this lack of stability that incites an individual 
to act as a free rider under the Lindahl mechanism. 
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